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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 14–16, 2015, Mark Matthews was tried in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County for sexual offense in the second degree (Count I), and sexual 
offense in the fourth degree (Count II).  Case No.1263769.  The jury found Mr. 
Matthews not guilty as to sexual offense in the second degree, and guilty as to 
sexual offense in the fourth degree.1  (T6. 5).  Mr. Matthews was sentenced to 365 
days, and received credit for the 365 days he had already served.  (T9. 12).  Mr. 
Matthews filed a timely notice of appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
on April 8, 2016.  This appeal follows.  
 
	  
																																																								
1 1 Citations to the trial transcript are as follows:  
• T1. = First hearing, Sept. 1, 2015;  
• T2. = Second hearing, Sept. 8, 2015;  
• T3. = Third hearing, Oct. 9, 2015;  
• T4. = First day of trial, Oct. 14, 2015;  
• T5. = Second day of trial, Oct. 15, 2015; 
• T6. = Third day of trial, Oct 16, 2015;  
• T7. = Fourth hearing, Mar. 24, 2016;  
• T8. = Fifth hearing, Apr. 4, 2016; and 
• T9. = Sentencing, Apr. 7. 2016. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the trial court err when it allowed government witness, Allison 
Stansbury, the purported victim in an unrelated case, to testify to the 
alleged prior bad act of Mr. Matthews? 
II. Did the trial court err when it did not allow defense counsel to use Allison 
Stansbury’s prior inconsistent statement to impeach her? 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 
 In late 2015, Mary Hunkeler walked into Damascus Tattoo Company and 
asked if there was anyone available to tattoo her.  (T4. 135).  The receptionist 
introduced Ms. Hunkeler to Mark A. Matthews, one of the tattoo artists at the 
shop.  (T4. 136).  Ms. Hunkeler and Mr. Matthews sat down to discuss the tattoo 
design Ms. Hunkeler wanted.  (T4. 136).  After looking at a few tattoo designs, Mr. 
Matthews told Ms. Hunkeler he would draw up a design and send her a rough 
outline of what the tattoo would look like.  (T4. 136).  Ms. Hunkeler liked the 
design Mr. Matthews sent her, so she made an appointment for November 22, 
2015.  (T4. 137). 
 Ms. Hunkeler wanted a large phoenix tattoo that would stretch from her 
right inner hip to her very inner thigh near her vagina.  (T4. 163, 173).  Ms. 
Hunkeler and Mr. Matthews agreed on a price of $350 for the tattoo.  (T4. 137).  
Because the tattoo was so large and the location so sensitive, Mr. Matthews said 
the tattooing process would need to be split across two separate days.  (T4. 137).  
Mr. Matthews estimated the first day of the process would take around four hours.  
(T4. 137). 
 On November 22, 2015, Ms. Hunkeler went to Damascus Tattoo for her 
scheduled appointment.  (T4. 138).  She brought her boyfriend, Calvin DaSilva, to 
sit with her while Mr. Matthews worked.  (T4. 138).  When Ms. Hunkeler arrived, 
she was brought to the room where Mr. Matthews would complete the tattoo.  (T4. 
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139).  The room was small and had a door with a window on it.  (T4. 140-41).  
Given the size and location of the tattoo Ms. Hunkeler had chosen, she decided to 
wear a tee shirt and a bikini bottom for the tattooing process.  (T4. 139).  Ms. 
Hunkeler was lying on the tattoo table, while her boyfriend, Mr. DaSilva, sat in a 
chair near her feet.  Mr. Matthews sat to her side as he worked.  (T4. 140-41). 
 Mr. Matthews showed Ms. Hunkeler the final design and put a stencil of 
the tattoo on the location she specified so Ms. Hunkeler could decide if she wished 
to change anything about the design or location.  (T4. 139).  She decided she did 
want to change the size and asked Mr. Matthews to make the tattoo even larger.  
(T4. 140).  He did as she requested, and then reapplied the new stencil.  (T4. 140). 
 Approximately 45 minutes before Mr. Matthews finished working, Mr. 
DaSilva announced that he had to leave to go to work.  (T4. 143).  During the entire 
tattooing process, there was a camera crew at the studio, making a promotional 
video of Damascus Tattoos.  (T4. 166).  In her later interview with police, Ms. 
Hunkeler said that someone, possibly a member of the camera crew, came in the 
room during the tattooing process and gave both she and Mr. Matthews a thumbs 
up.  (T4. 168).  Mr. Matthews told her this was distracting and asked if she minded 
if he closed the door.  (T4. 168).  Ms. Hunkeler told Mr. Matthews that she was 
“okay with it.”  (T4. 169). 
 Ms. Hunkeler testified that at some point after the door closed, Mr. 
Matthews inappropriately touched her vagina for about twenty minutes and that he 
penetrated her with his finger continuously for about five minutes.  (T4. 144-45).  
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She also told police that his fingers were inside of her for thirty minutes.  (T4. 156).  
Ms. Hunkeler further testified that during the time she said Mr. Matthews was 
touching her inappropriately, he was also: wearing thick black gloves, using at 
least one hand to hold the tattoo gun, using at least one hand to reload the gun with 
ink periodically, using one or both hands to hold her skin taut as he was applying 
the tattoo, and using at least one hand to wipe the tattooed area clean of blood.  
(T4. 169, 176-79).  Ms. Hunkeler testified that during the alleged touching, Mr. 
Matthews did not say anything inappropriate to her, did not look her in the eye, 
did not breathe heavily, and did not acknowledge in any fashion that he was 
touching her in an inappropriate fashion.  (T4. 178). 
 During the tattoo process Ms. Hunkeler texted back and forth with her 
boyfriend, Mr. DaSilva, who had left to go to work.  (T4. 146).  She sent several 
messages to him while the inappropriate touching allegedly occurred.  (T4. 160).  
She first wrote, “I feel violated.”  (T4. 160).  She next messaged him saying, “I 
can’t really tell what he’s doing because I’m in pain.”  (T4. 160).  She next wrote, 
“He’s getting kind of close to fingering me.”  (T4. 160).  She next sent him a 
message saying that she thought she was “going to cry.”  (T4. 160).  Her final 
message was “He’s done, I’m leaving.”  (T4. 160). 
 As Mr. Matthews had initially estimated, the tattoo session lasted just over 
four hours.  (T4. 186).  At the end of the session, Ms. Hunkeler paid Mr. Matthews 
in the room where she got the tattoo.  (T4. 151).  She gave him the full amount of 
the tattoo, plus a $40 tip.  (T4. 172).  Ms. Hunkeler then met her mom, Nancy 
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Hunkeler, in the lobby.  (T4. 151).  The receptionist of the tattoo studio, Jocelyn 
Amoroso, testified that Ms. Hunkeler was acting normally, gave Mr. Matthews a 
large tip, and hugged Mr. Matthews before she left.  (T5. 131).  
 When Ms. Hunkeler got in her mother’s car, she started crying and told her 
mother that Mr. Matthews’ fingers were “at the crotch,” but never penetrated her.  
(T5. 11).  Ms. Hunkeler called the police about two hours after she got home.  (T4. 
191).  She also subsequently sought psychological counseling, was diagnosed with 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and was prescribed medication.  (T4. 153-54).  
Testimony at trial revealed that Ms. Hunkeler had pre-existing mental health 
issues.  (T4. 183-84). 
 To bolster its case against Mark Matthews, the prosecution was allowed to 
call a second witness named Allison Stansbury.  (T5. 58).  Ms. Stansbury testified 
that Mark Matthews had inappropriately touched her in a similar fashion while he 
tattooed her.  (T5. 58).  Over defense counsel’s objection, the court found 
Stansbury’s testimony admissible as other bad acts evidence that demonstrated a 
common scheme or plan, motive, intent, opportunity, knowledge, absence of 
mistake, or accident.  (T5. 58).  
 Ms. Stansbury testified that she was tattooed by Mark Matthews twice.  (T5. 
66).  Ms. Stansbury was 19 or 20 when she got her first tattoo, which was a small 
teapot behind her ear.  (T5. 67).  When Ms. Stansbury later decided to get a second 
tattoo, she returned to Mr. Matthews because she was pleased with his work from 
the first tattoo.  (T5. 66).  Ms. Stansbury told the jury that during the second tattoo 
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session she brought her boyfriend, Kyle Logan, and his brother, Zack, to the 
appointment.  (T5. 76).  Kyle Logan and Zack were in the room during the entire 
tattoo session, sitting an arm’s distance of away from Stansbury.  (T5. 91-95).  
Throughout the tattoo there were also people walking by the room and poking 
their heads in.  (T5. 96).  Nonetheless, it was still Ms. Stansbury’s testimony that 
during the tattoo process, Mark Matthews touched her vagina for twenty minutes.  
(T5. 103).  
 Ms. Stansbury did not say anything to Mr. Logan or Zack when this 
touching supposedly occurred.  (T5. 80).  It was not until Ms. Stansbury got home 
from the appointment that she told Mr. Logan that she was not sure anything 
happened, but thought Mark Matthews might have touched her.  (T5. 80-81).  
When Ms. Stansbury was interviewed by police after the incident, Stansbury again 
confirmed that she “couldn’t say” if Mr. Matthews ever penetrated her labia.  (T5. 
90).  Police also interviewed Kyle Logan after the alleged incident.  (T5. 123).  He 
explained in a statement that Allison Stansbury told him that, “She was so 
conflicted about whether or not it had happened because, you know, where he was 
and where the tattoo was located.”  (T5. 123).  Logan further explained Stansbury 
told him, “the tattoo was in a spot that, you know, where she had thought that 
maybe he had accidently touched her.”  (T5. 123). 
 During Mark Matthews’ trial, Ms. Stansbury had become much more 
certain of her claim.  (T5. 81).  She told Mr. Matthews’ jury that the inappropriate 
contact “definitely happened.”  (T5. 81).  Defense counsel attempted to impeach 
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Ms. Stansbury’s testimony using the statements she made to Mr. Logan.  (T5. 123). 
But, the trial judge did not allow defense counsel to cross-examine Ms. Stansbury 
with her prior inconsistent statements.  (T5. 83).  The defense also sought to 
impeach Stansbury’s testimony by calling Kyle Logan as a witness to tell the jury 
what Stansbury had previously told him.  (T5. 122).  The court refused to allow Mr. 
Logan to be called.  (T5. 126).  
 At the close of the evidence, the jury found Mr. Matthews guilty of a fourth 
degree sex offense against Ms. Hunkeler.  (T6. 5).  
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ARGUMENT 
I. ALLISON STANSBURY, THE PURPORTED VICTIM IN AN 
UNRELATED CASE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO 
TESTIFY ABOUT MARK MATTHEWS’ ALLEGED PRIOR BAD 
ACT  BECAUSE THE UNFAIR PREJUDICE OF HER TESTIMONY 
SUBSTANITALLY OUTWEIGHED ITS PROBATIVE VALUE. 
 
 In an effort to bolster its claim that Mark Matthews touched Mary Hunkeler 
inappropriately as he was giving her a tattoo, the State introduced the testimony of 
Allison Stansbury.  (T2. 25).  Stansbury was another tattoo client of Mark 
Matthews who claimed he touched her inappropriately too.  (T2. 25).  Defense 
counsel objected to the admissibility of Stansbury’s testimony both because it was 
unclear the inappropriate touching she reported ever happened, and because any 
probative value of her testimony was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  (T2. 11, T5. 57). 
The law does not presume the defendant is of good character.  Greer v. 
United States, 245 U.S. 559, 560 (1918).  The law also, however, does not allow 
the prosecution to urge a jury to convict by presenting evidence that does little 
more than establish the accused is a “bad person.”  Michelson v. United States, 
335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).  
 In keeping with these rules, the State is not allowed to introduce the 
defendant’s prior bad acts, even though such acts might logically be useful to the 
prosecution in establishing that the accused is, by propensity, more likely to have 
committed the crime.  Id.  This evidence of character is not excluded because it is 
irrelevant, rather evidence of bad character is excluded because it weighs too 
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heavily with the jury, and tends to over-persuade them to prejudge the defendant.  
Id. at 475-76.  Evidence of bad character is excluded because such evidence tends 
to cause confusion of the issues, unfair surprises, and undue prejudice.  Id. 
  While evidence of other bad acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in a sense of propensity, under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), evidence of prior 
bad acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.  Md. R. 5-404(b).  A three-pronged test governs 
the admissibility of other bad acts evidence.  Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 316 
(1998); State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634 (1989); Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 
64, 125 (2003). 
 The trial court first must determine if the evidence fits within one or more 
of the exceptions to the rule.  Wynn, 351 Md. at 316.  If the evidence does not fit 
within one of the specified exceptions of Rule 5-404(b), then the evidence is not 
allowed.  Id.  This threshold decision does not involve any discretion on the part of 
the trial court.  Id.  If the trial court determines the evidence fits within one of the 
narrow exceptions of Rule 5-404(b), then the trial court must determine whether 
the accused’s involvement in the other bad acts is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Id.  Lastly, if the first two prongs are satisfied, the trial court 
must undergo an additional balancing test to weigh the necessity for, and probative 
value of, the other bad acts evidence against any undue prejudice likely to result 
from its admission.  Wynn, 351 Md. at 316.   
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 In the instant case, Allison Stansbury’s testimony did not fit into any of the 
exceptions specified by Rule 5-404(b).  The trial judge said he was allowing 
Stansbury’s testimony to demonstrate Mark Matthews common scheme or plan, 
motive, intent, opportunity, knowledge, absence of mistake, or accident.  (T2. 25).  
The only reasoning why the trial judge gave for allowing the evidence of the 
alleged prior bad acts under all of these exceptions was that the two alleged acts 
were “similar.”  (T2. 25). 
 However, contrary to the trial judge’s ruling, in cases where the defendant’s 
position is that the charged act never happened, prior bad acts tend not to be 
admissible under Rule 5-404(b).  This is because, in such a case, the other bad acts 
evidence would not preempt a defense claim of mistaken identity, nor would it 
rebut a defense assertion that what did happen was simply a mistake.  McKinney v. 
State, 82 Md. App. 111, 127 (1990).  Similarly, where the defense is “it never 
happened,” such other bad acts evidence does not establish a claimed lack of intent 
on the defendant’s part, but instead is offered only to establish propensity.  Id. at 
124.  Therefore, where the defendant’s position is that the acts never happened, 
evidence tending to show multiple offenses would not establish motive, 
opportunity, preparation, or knowledge.  Id. 
 Also, where the defendant’s identity is not at issue, and the act was not part 
of a grand scheme to commit others, it is improper to allow the evidence of prior 
bad acts under the common scheme or plan exception.  Reidnauer v. State, 133 
Md. App. 311, 321 (2000).  Evidence of other bad acts is typically only allowed 
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under the common scheme or plan exception in two scenarios.  Id.  the first 
scenario, the evidence is allowed to establish a defendant’s typical modus 
operandi, when identity is at issue.  Id. 
Alternatively, such evidence might properly be admissible under the 
common scheme or plan exception when one bad act is presumed to be part of a 
grand scheme to commit others, “such as a theft of nitroglycerine for use in 
blowing open a safe.”  Id.  The concurrence of common features under the 
common scheme exception to the other bad acts rule must be more than a manner 
of operation, which is possessed by most people who commit the bad act at issue.  
Reidnauer, 133 Md. App. at 321.  These limits on other bad acts evidence in “it 
never happened” cases are illustrated by this court’s decisions in McKinney v. 
State, 82 Md. App. 111 (1990) and Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64 (2003). 
 In McKinney, an outdoor education teacher was convicted of third degree 
sexual assault for inappropriately touching three young campers.  McKinney, 82 
Md. App. at 125.  The victims alleged McKinney had touched them in 
inappropriate areas, but McKinney consistently denied any misconduct.  Id. at 
114.  McKinney freely admitted he was in situations where he made socially 
acceptable physical contact with the victims, such as when he hugged them or 
patted them on the back, or applied insect repellant.  Id.  When McKinney was 
asked if he could have possibly touched the girls inappropriately by accident, 
McKinney conceded that he may have accidentally touched the girls, but did not 
say that he ever touched them on any intimate part of their bodies.  Id. at 115.  
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 This court held that the combined testimony of the three alleged victims 
might very well have tended to disprove any defense based on accident or mistake.  
McKinney, 82 Md. App. at 125.  But, since no such defense was asserted, there 
was no material fact to be established by the other bad acts evidence.  Id.  
 In McKinney, this court also held that evidence tending to show the 
commission of similar conduct with a different victim would not be relevant to 
establish, motive, opportunity, preparation, or knowledge.  Id. at 124.  This court 
reasoned that the evidence of other similar victims would not show intent except 
in the sense of propensity.  Id. at 124.   
 As for the common scheme or plan exception, in McKinney, because 
identity was not at issue and the inappropriate touching of one victim was not part 
of a grand scheme to commit others, this court concluded the evidence of similar 
inappropriate touching of multiple victims would not tend to prove that these acts 
were part of a common scheme or plan.  McKinney, 82 Md. App. at 124.   
 Similarly, in Reidnauer, this court considered the improper admission of 
other bad acts evidence in a rape case where the defendant was suspected of a 
second rape against a different victim.  Reidnauer, 133 Md. App. at 323-24.  
Using Rule 404(b)’s common scheme or plan exception, the prosecution sought to 
introduce the testimony of the second alleged victim in an attempt to bolster its 
case for guilt in connection with the first.  Id.  This court held that even though the 
two events had “many similarities,” they were not part of a common scheme or 
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plan because identity was not at issue, nor was one rape a part of a grand scheme 
to commit other rapes.  Id.   
 Again, in Behrel v. State, this court held that testimony of similar victims 
was not admissible to show that a priest’s molestation of several children was part 
of a common scheme or plan, even though they were all groomed and molested in 
similar ways.  Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 132. This court mirrored the analysis it 
provided in McKinney.  Because identity was not at issue, evidence that appellant 
engaged in similar conduct would not show the defendant planned to “commit one 
offense as part of a grand scheme to commit others.”  Id. at 130. 
 Conversely, in Cousar, this court found that evidence of other bad acts was 
correctly admitted.  Cousar v. State, 198 Md. App. 486 (2011).  In Cousar, the 
appellant was accused of raping and assaulting a Craigslist prostitute whose 
services he had procured.  Id. at 515.  During the attack, Cousar was accused of 
defecating in the woman’s mouth against her wishes.  Id.  Cousar maintained that 
the defecation had been completely accidental during consensual analingus (oral-
anal sexual contact).  Id.  The prosecution introduced the testimony of a second 
woman who Cousar had assaulted in a similar manner on a separate occasion.  
Cousar, 198 Md. App. at 515.  The court found the admission of the second 
woman’s testimony was proper in light of Cousar’s defense of accident.  Id.   
 In the instant case, the admission of the other bad acts evidence was 
improper and should have been excluded as it was in McKinney, Reidnauer and 
Behrel.  Mark Matthews did not deny making appropriate physical contact with 
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Mary Hunkeler.  Given the nature of the tattooing process, Matthews obviously 
was forced to make physical contact with those parts of Hunkeler’s body where 
she instructed him to apply the tattoo.  However, he completely denied ever 
touching her (or the prosecution’s “other bad acts” witness Allison Stansbury) in 
an inappropriate way.  
 Mark Matthews’ defense at trial was “it never happened.”  As defense 
counsel explained during opening argument, “Mistake, misperception, and 
misinterpretation.  That’s why we’re here.  We’re here because Mary Hunkeler 
made a mistake.  She misperceived a physical contact that took place on her leg 
next to her vagina because the tattoo that she wanted was next to her vagina.  
We’re here because Mary misinterpreted a sensation.”  (T4. 126).  In opening 
argument, defense counsel further elaborated, “Mark Matthews never touched 
Mary Hunkeler inappropriately.”  (T4. 127) (emphasis added).  As defense counsel 
reminded the jury during closing,  “It didn’t happen. Mr. Matthews never touched 
her inappropriately.”  (T4. 169) (emphasis added).  In closing argument, defense 
counsel further argued, “This is not a sexual case. It is about Mary making a 
mistake. It is about her convincing herself that something happened when it did 
not.  (T4. 177) (emphasis added).   
 It follows that since the only concern was whether the inappropriate contact 
happened, allowing Stansbury’s testimony to show intent, knowledge, motive, or 
opportunity, did nothing except to suggest to the jury that Mark Matthews had a 
propensity to sexually abuse his customers.  Allowing this evidence did nothing 
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except to bolster Mary Hunkeler’s credibility in the eyes of the jury.  Also, since 
identity was not an issue, nor was one bad act part of a grand scheme to commit 
others bad acts, this testimony could not have been allowed under the common 
scheme or plan exception. 
Because Allison Stansbury’s testimony was inappropriately introduced to 
bolster Mary Hunkeler’s believability, Mark Matthews was deprived of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.  The introduction of other bad acts evidence had 
prejudicial effects that far outweighed any probative value.  Moreover, as 
discussed in detail in the next section, following the trial court’s improper 
allowance of Stansbury’s testimony, the court refused to allow defense counsel to 
impeach Stansbury, further denying Mark Matthews Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial.  The trial judge erred in allowing the other bad acts evidence to come in 
under all of the Rule 5-404(b) exceptions because they were “similar.” 
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II. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL 
TO IMPEACH ALLISON STANSBURY USING HER PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. 
 
 The trial court compounded its error of admitting Allison Stansbury’s 
“other bad acts” testimony by then refusing to allow the defense to properly 
challenge Ms. Stansbury’s claims.  On examination, Allison Stansbury asserted 
that the inappropriate touching by Mark Matthews “definitely happened.”  (T5. 
81).  However, Ms. Stansbury had previously told her boyfriend, Kyle Logan, she 
was not sure whether any inappropriate touching occurred.  (T5. 123).  These prior 
inconsistent statements had been reduced to writing and recorded in notes from the 
police interview of Kyle Logan.  Nonetheless, defense counsel was improperly 
precluded from using the prior inconsistent statements to impeach Allison 
Stansbury’s testimony before the jury. 
 When interviewed by police shortly after the tattoo, Stansbury’s boyfriend, 
Logan, explained to officers what Stansbury told him about the alleged incident.  
(T5. 123).  Logan told police that Stansbury told him how “She was so conflicted 
about whether or not it had happened because, you know, where he was and where 
the tattoo was located.”  (T5. 123).  Logan further explained Stansbury told him, 
“the tattoo was in a spot that, you know, where she had thought that maybe he had 
accidently touched her.”  (T5. 123) (emphasis added).  Defense counsel attempted 
to impeach Ms. Stansbury on cross-examination using her statements that she was 
not sure whether any inappropriate touching ever occurred.  (T5. 81, 123).  The 
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trial judge repeatedly sustained the State’s objections to defense counsel’s 
questions.  (T5. 81).  
 The following colloquy shows how Stansbury firmly asserted on cross-
examination that when she spoke to Logan, she was “sure that the contact 
definitely happened,” and she was one hundred percent sure that the contact was 
intentional: 
COUNSEL:  It’s only after you got home and you were with him 
that you told him what you believed happened right? 
WITNESS:  Yes, ma’am.  
COUNSEL:  And when you talked to Kyle you were conflicted 
about what happened, correct? 
WITNESS:   Correct. 
COUNSEL:  And you were not sure whether the contact that you 
described to the jury today, you were not sure that 
the contact was an intentional contact, correct.  
STATE:  Objection. 
COURT:  Overruled. 
WINTESS:  I was sure that the contact definitely happened.  
COUNSEL:  Correct, that’s not my question. 
WITNESS:  Yes. 
COUNSEL:  The question is, when you spoke to Kyle you told 
Kyle that you were not sure whether the contact was 
intentional, correct? 
WITNESS:  Not true, no. 
COUNSEL:  Okay, so you were one hundred percent sure when 
you spoke with Kyle that the contact was 
intentional? 
WITNESS:  Yes, ma’am. 
 
(T5. 102-03) (emphasis added).  
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  The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the right of an 
accused in a criminal prosecution “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).  
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States.  
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).  The Supreme Court has long held that 
a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-
examination.  Id.  at 418.  Cross-examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of her testimony are tested.  Id. 
 “It is enough to compel a reversal that a constitutional right was improperly 
restricted leaving prejudice an obvious possibility.”  Reese v. State, 54 Md. App. 
281, 291 (1983).  When a constitutional right is infringed, the usual broad 
discretion of the trial judge becomes narrow.  Id. at 286.  
 “The credibility of a witness may be impeached by showing that the 
witness has made statements which contradict the witness’s trial testimony as to 
material facts provided a proper foundation has been established.”  Gonzalez v. 
State, 388 Md. 63, 70 (2005).  “A witness generally may be cross-examined on 
any matter relevant to the issues, and the witness’s credibility is always relevant.”  
Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md. App. 472, 480 (2000).  Where the limitations imposed by 
the court upon cross-examination plainly inhibit the ability of the accused to 
obtain a fair trial, the general rule of allowing the trial judge to determine what is 
allowed to be asked on cross examination is manifestly inapplicable.  Cox v. State, 
51 Md. App. 271, 282 (1982); De Lilly v. State, 11 Md. App. 676, 681 (1971).  
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 Md. Rule 5-616 sets out specific rules that must be followed for methods of 
impeachment.  Md. R. 5-616.  Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(1) provides that the 
credibility of a witness may be attacked through questions asked of the witness, 
under Rule 5-613(a) that the witness has made statements that are inconsistent 
with the witness’s present testimony.  Md. R. 5-613(a). 
 Maryland Rule 5-613(a) provides that a party may examine a witness about 
a prior inconsistent statement as long Rule 5-613(a)’s two requirements have been 
met.  Id.  First, at some point during her examination, the witness must be 
presented with the statement.  Brooks v. State, 439 Md. 698, 716 (2014).  Second, 
the witness must be given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement.  Id.  
Once these two prerequisites have been satisfied, cross-examination seeking to 
impeach with prior inconsistent statements is permissible.  Id. 
 In addition to cross examining the witness, counsel may also seek to 
introduce extrinsic evidence for the purpose of impeaching a witness with his or 
her own prior inconsistent statements.  Id. at 716-17.  As long as the proper 
framework is laid before the end of examination of the witness, counsel may call 
another witness to testify about the first witness’s prior inconsistent statements.  
Brooks, 439 Md. at 717. 
 The Maryland Court of Appeals has derived a four-prong test to be used 
when determining when Rule 5-613 can be used for a party to offer extrinsic 
evidence of a prior allegedly inconsistent oral statement of a witness.  Id.  The first 
two prongs of the test are the same as the prongs needed to utilize a prior 
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inconsistent statement on cross-examination.  First, at some point during 
examination, the witness needs to be presented with the statement.  Id.  Second, 
the witness needs to be given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement.  Id.  
Third, the witness must refuse to admit she made the statement.  Brooks, 439 Md. 
at 717.  Lastly, the statement must not be “collateral” to the issues at trial.  Id. 
 In Cox, the defendant was accused of rape, and the sole witness was the 
victim.  Cox, 51 Md. App. at 274.  At trial, the judge barred defense counsel from 
impeaching the witness.  Id.  This court found reversible error because the 
defendant was precluded from attempting to undermine the victim’s credibility, 
and the exclusion of counsel’s question violated the defendant’s right to present 
his defense fully.  Id. at 282.  
 Along these same lines, in Warren, this court held the trial court did not err 
by allowing the cross-examination of a witness as to his alleged out-of-court 
confessions made to a third party while incarcerated.  Warren, 205 Md. App. at 
126.  This court held that the State laid a proper foundation for impeachment 
under Md. Rule 5-613(a) when the witness was informed of the statement and then 
given an opportunity to admit, deny, or explain the statement.  Id. at 127. 
 Similarly, in Foreman v. State, the wife and son of the defendant would not 
testify to the defendant’s abuse when called to testify at trial.  Foreman v. State, 
125 Md. App. 28, 32 (1999).  At the scene of the crime, the wife and son told 
police and an EMT about the abuse from the defendant.  Id.  The mother and the 
son were shown their previous statements at trial, which they then were given a 
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chance to respond to, and they denied making the statements.  Id.   The issue was 
not collateral to the issues at trial, therefore, all four prongs had been met and this 
court held that it was not error for the police officer and EMT to testify in order to 
impeach the hostile witnesses.  Id. 
 In the instant case, defense counsel was improperly precluded from either 
method of impeachment, even though counsel satisfied all of the necessary 
prerequisites for both methods.  On cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly 
attempted to impeach Stansbury using her own prior inconsistent statement.  (T5. 
102-03).  The following colloquy is illustrative: 
 COUNSEL: Now I just want to make sure that you never said any of the  
   following words to Kyle, okay? 
 
 STATE: Objection. 
 COURT:  Sustained.  
 COUNSEL: You never told Kyle? 
 STATE: Objection. 
 COURT: Sustained. 
COUNSEL: Well your statement today was that you never told 
Kyle that considering the location of where your 
tattoo was -- 
STATE: Objection. 
COURT: Sustained.  
COUNSEL:  You never used the word “accident?” 
STATE:  Objection. 
COURT:  Sustained.  
COUNSEL:  Did you use to him the word -- 
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STATE:  Objection. 
COURT:  Sustained.  
(T5. 102-03).  As the record reflects, the trial judge completely precluded defense 
counsel from asking about the statements that Ms. Stansbury made to Kyle Logan 
shortly after getting her tattoo.  (T5. 102-03).  This line of questioning was 
necessary for impeachment purposes, given Stansbury’s testimony that she was 
one hundred percent positive that the inappropriate touching definitely happened.  
 Not only was defense counsel not allow to directly impeach Allison 
Stansbury with her own statements, defense counsel was similarly precluded from 
introducing extrinsic evidence of Stansbury’s prior statements.  (T5. 125).  After 
the State rested, defense counsel attempted to call Kyle Logan as a witness to ask 
Logan about Stansbury’s statements to him that contact may not have happened 
and if it did it may have been accidental.  (T5. 125).  The trial judge did not allow 
Logan to testify.  (T5. 126).  The trial judge reasoned that Logan should not be 
allowed to testify because his statements were merely his interpretation of what 
Stansbury had been feeling, as opposed to what she said actually said to him.  (T5. 
126).  As a factual matter, the record refutes the trial judge’s assumption that the 
statements were not Stansbury’s own.  
 Kyle Logan told police, “She’s telling me she was so conflicted about 
whether or not it happened because, you know, where he was and where the tattoo 
was located. She didn’t want to accuse him of doing that.”  (T5. 123) (emphasis 
added).  The words “She’s telling me” indicate that what Kyle Logan was 
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reporting was not merely his interpretation of how Stansbury was feeling, but 
rather was Logan was telling police what Stansbury told him.  Logan further 
explained Stansbury told him, “the tattoo was in a spot that, you know, where she 
had thought that maybe he had accidently touched her.”  (T5. 123) (emphasis 
added).  The words “she had thought,” indicate again that this is how Stansbury 
told Logan she was feeling, not how Logan interpreted Stansbury to be feeling. 
Stansbury testified she did not say anything to Logan while he was in the 
room with her during the entire tattoo session.   (T5. 80-81).  Nor did she say 
anything to him during the ride home.  (T5. 80-81).  Instead, Stansbury’s very first 
disclosure to Logan was back at the house, where she told Logan that “she thought 
maybe he had had accidentally touched her,” and her statement that “she was 
conflicted about whether or not it happened.”  Kyle Logan relayed these 
statements to police.  (T5. 80-81).  These statements were a critical piece of the 
defense’s case.  
 Not allowing Kyle Logan to testify was error because all four necessary 
prongs required by Maryland courts in order to introduce extrinsic evidence were 
met.  As mentioned, the first two prongs were established on cross-examination 
when defense counsel attempted to read Stansbury her prior statement, which she 
would have had the opportunity to explain or deny.  (T5. 81, 102-03).  The third 
prong, that the witness needs to deny making the statement, was established when 
Stansbury told defense counsel, “Not true, no,” when asked if she’d ever told 
Logan the contact might not have been intentional.  (T5. 81, 102-03).  The fourth 
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prong was met because the statement was non-collateral to the issues at trial.  (T5. 
81, 102-03).  The statements were directly related to whether the inappropriate 
touching actually happened.  
 As seen in Cox, where the credibility of a witness is a critical piece of the 
case, it is required that counsel be allowed to impeach the witness in order to 
undermine her credibility.  Cox, 51 Md. App. at 282.  Matthews’ defense rested 
entirely upon the jury’s belief that the claimed offensive contacts had not 
happened.  Not allowing Stansbury to be impeached by her own prior inconsistent 
statement undercut Matthews’ defense.  Defense counsel should have been 
permitted to introduce Stansbury’s prior inconsistent statement on cross-
examination, as in Warren, or through the testimony of another, as in Foreman.   
 Matthews was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial when 
defense counsel was not allowed to press the credibility of one of Matthews’ key 
accusers by impeaching her with her prior inconsistent statement that she was 
unsure whether anything inappropriate ever happened.  Reversal is required.  
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CONCLUSION 
	
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Matthews respectfully requests that his 
conviction be overturned, and his case remanded for a new trial. 
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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
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